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Elder

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(5/24)

EYES ONLY

18 May 1960

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Conversation with Mr. Pat Coyne

Mr. Pat Coyne informed me that on two occasions the Chairman of the President's Board in oral presentations to the President strongly endorsed the Agency's aerial reconnaissance operations. The first occasion was some two years ago; the second in February 1960. On this latter occasion an aide memoir was prepared which Mr. Coyne believes was shown to you in advance of the meeting with the President. It was read to the President by Gen. Hull but not left with him.

Mr. Coyne also stated that the subject will be included in the Board's current report soon to be submitted to the President. Gen. Hull may wish to meet with you on his return sometime next week for a further discussion of the matter.

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[Redacted]
Acting Inspector General

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cc: DDCI ✓

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6 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

SUBJECT: Chronological Account of Handling of
U-2 Incident

1. The following points on the Chronology still need to be checked:

a. On 4 May, was anyone from NASA in on the preparation of the question and answer briefing?

b. On 5 May, Mr. Dulles wants a tight chronological order and has indicated by his notes, wants the exact text of the Hagerty statement and the exact time of the release of the Hagerty statement.

c. On page 6, Mr. Bohlen either did ~~not~~ did not hold a background meeting.

d. On Page 9, Mr. Dulles wants a brief expansion of his presentation to the Congressional leaders.

e. On 12 May, General Goodpaster telephoned Mr. Dulles to say that further flights should be suspended. Mr. Dulles wants this fact included.

2. All of these points can be checked in your conferences with State, Defense and NASA. I have the exact text of Hagerty's announcement and will find out the time of release. If you wish, since I have the text of Mr. Dulles' statement to Congress on 9 May, I will make that entry.

WALTER ELDER
Assistant to the Director

Attached:
Chronological Account

Excerpt from Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Commission Report on Intelligence Activities,
A Report to the Congress, June 1955 (Clark Task Force)

Failure to produce certain elements of intelligence has been due in part to the restrictive effects of some of our national attitudes and policies toward the collection of intelligence so necessary for effective resistance to Soviet aggression. Also, among some of those responsible for implementation of our foreign policy by diplomacy and negotiation, there seems to exist an abhorrence to anything that might lead to diplomatic or even protocol complications.

This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at times has stifled initiative and action in the collection of intelligence. Some of these efforts, if permitted to proceed properly, might have brought direct and immediate results and made positive contributions to the national welfare that would have justified the attendant political risks and possible inconsequential diplomatic embarrassment.

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